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A FEW THOUGHTS ON CONSTITUTIONALISM,
TEXTUALISM, AND POPULISM
Akhil Reed Amar*
1 JERE is a confession. I am not a theorist, I am not a philosopher.
X From time to time, I think about and write about the Constitu-
tion. I suppose if someone asked me, "What is your constitutional
philosophy?" I might say that I am a constitutionalist, a textualist,
and a populist. Now, I am, from time to time, more than those things,
but let me explain those three words and their triangular interrelation.
Let's start with constitutionalism and textualism. In ordinary lan-
guage we talk about the Constitution, that's what it says here on the
cover of my handy-dandy pocket copy. It is a text with four prover-
bial corners. It actually uses words like "this Constitution" to describe
itself as a document. I don't want to suggest that's all that constitu-
tionalism is, but I think one important part of constitutionalism is this
text, both in ordinary language and legal language. It is, of course,
more than that. It is an act, a doing, an ordainment and establish-
ment, a constituting, a constitution.
I think this connects to the linkage between constitutionalism and
populism, the second leg of this triangle. The Constitution as an act is
a dramatically populist act. Judged by philosophical standards, we
look back and we are embarrassed, when we see the exclusion of
slaves, when we see the exclusion of free blacks in some places, when
we see the exclusion of women, when we see property qualifications in
some states.
Judged by the standard of history, however, the ratification of the
federal Constitution was the most populist act in the history of the
world up to that point. As Jed Rubenfeld has reminded us, ancient
democracies had theories of democracy, but not of constitution-mak-
ing. Instead, you had some great man claiming a pipeline to God:
Solon, Lycurgus, Moses on Sinai. You did not have the act of consti-
tution-making as involving this populist participation. You didn't
have that with most of the state constitutions. You didn't have that
with the Articles of Confederation. You didn't have that in most of
the societies around the world that had been governed by immemorial
custom or the lord of the manor or some strong military figure who
just happened to be there. So, as an act of ordainment and establish-
ment, it seems that there is an obvious connection between constitu-
tionalism and populism.
* Southmayd Professor, Yale Law School What follows are oral remarks deliv-
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When we look at the subsequent acts involving later generations of
"We the People," expanding the definitions of "the People" to include
blacks, to include women, to include people who can't pay poll taxes,
it seems to me that all of this is a continuous enactment of populism.
When we look at the text, it starts with "We the People do ordain and
establish this Constitution," which is a performative utterance. It ends
with Article VII, which tells us how to ordain and establish-through
these ratifying conventions of the people. Also, the Republican Form
of Government Clause is a dramatic reaffirmation of the centrality of
popular self-rule. You look at the Bill of Rights, for example, and five
of the first ten amendments have this word, the "people," in them. So
there is a connection between constitutionalism and populism. Put a
different way, I don't think any account of the Constitution is really
ultimately persuasive unless it comes to grips with issues of popular
sovereignty and self-government over time.
Finally, we come to the third leg of our triangle, the link between
textualism and populism: What is the connection there? Well, one
thing about the document is it is a shared text that all Americans have.
It is short, and I think that is nice not just because that liberates
judges, but because it is written in a kind of compact, lapidary way, as
Larry Sager pointed out. I think it is nice for ordinary citizens that it
has that feature, because I think constitutionalism occurs outside the
courts. This textual document offers a vocabulary and grammar of
argumentation for people whose parents and grandparents came from
all different parts of the world. This is one of the things-in an eighth-
grade civics way of thinking-that we Americans have in common,
one of the things that constitute us as Americans. And I think it is,
perhaps, a superior form of constituting us as Americans than the fact
that we all watch Seinfeld and Friends on Thursday night.
There is in this society perhaps a connection to Protestantism and,
as Sandy Levinson has pointed out, in a Protestant culture there is an
emphasis on text. I don't want to affirm the idea of sola scriptura, that
it's text only, but it seems to me that text does matter in this culture.
This helps account for the brute textuality of the thing. The fact is,
dormant clauses from time to time can resurface because they just
happen to be here and they are printed in everyone's document. So,
you never know when the Tenth Amendment will rise from the dead.
(Consider also Sandy Levinson's favorite Second Amendment, which
is talked about a lot outside of courts and law school classrooms.)
Thus, it is an important fact that there is that word equal in the
Fourteenth Amendment in a way that the word wasn't in the South
African pre-apartheid constitution. That word may have slumbered
for many years, but it too had the possibility of reawakening because
of this brute textuality.
That's my own approach. Let me now try to engage Jack Rakove's
account of originalism. For my purposes I want to focus on two points
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that he makes. One, that the Constitution basically is not ratified
clause by clause, but in toto. Second, that there is an indeterminacy
problem for originalists of a certain stripe.
I agree with those two points. I think the first point emphasizes the
importance of looking at the Constitution as a whole, because what
was ratified was the document, not individual clauses. The clause is
not the unit, or at least the only unit of analysis, as Jed Rubenfeld at
times might seem to be suggesting. The generation is not the only unit
of constitutional analysis, as Bruce Ackerman might have been
misheard to say. At the very least, the document as a whole is an
important unit of analysis. This is not a revolutionary idea. This is
what John Marshall meant when he said, "It is a constitution we are
expounding."' It is not a clause, not a generation, but a Constitution.
So, even before we have the problem of synthesis across genera-
tions, which Bruce rightly reminds us of, we had, even at the founding,
this difficulty of synthesis across seven articles and ten amendments.
It seems to me that this requires what Charles Black would call struc-
tural analysis to see connections, what Ronald Dworkin might call in-
tegrity-the idea of something that coheres together as one law that
does not contradict itself, but rather whose parts harmoniously fit to-
gether into a whole. This is what Mike McConnell, I think, was trying
to suggest when he talked about the perspective of the Constitution
itself-the document having an entirety, a vision, a purpose, a theory.
Jack's second point is that history can sometimes help identify par-
ticularly snug constitutional interpretations. History is not the only
source of this, or the ultimate source, but it may help us distinguish
between the genuine architecture of the thing and mere accidents of
it. Or help distinguish between generally good readings and overread-
ings, as we seek to discover the Constitution's own theory. Here the
vision is of history, not just as a handmaiden to pure justice on the
justice-seeking account, as Chris Eisgruber might have suggested, but
history as a handmaiden to snug interpretation, a particularly well-
fitting, aesthetically pleasing, illuminating interpretation.
Since I am not a fancy theorist, I am just going to have to give you
three or four examples of what I mean so you can try to see the thing
in action. Let's begin with a really easy one. The Constitution doesn't
say "separation of powers" in so many words, it doesn't say "federal-
ism" in so many words. I think a particularly useful way of interpret-
ing the document is to say that there is an architecture to Articles I, II,
and III. It seems that there may even be some important implications
about the order. Lawmaking typically occurs before adjudication. As
you look at these three separate articles, you might think there is a
theory of co-ordinacy, although perhaps the legislature, in some ways,
is primus inter pares, first among equals. You might look at that and
1. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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try to develop a theory of legislation as general and prospective be-
hind a suitably impersonal veil of ignorance, whereas adjudication is
specific and retrospective, since judges know who the parties are.
That might be supported by textual references to case and controversy
in Article III, or Bill of Attainder and ex post facto bans in Article I.
So, you begin to see a general theory of the rule of law.
When you derive this theory from the architecture of the thing, it
seems helpful to read historical accounts because you realize you are
not making it all up. You realize that this theory actually was part of
the meaning of the document-what it was trying to do, but not in so
many words in any given clause. Thus, we should aspire to account
for all the different provisions, dealing with allocation of power be-
tween center and periphery, to come up with a theory of federalism.
Thus, we see how federalism, like separation of powers, was designed
to achieve certain purposes of checking and balancing power. History
here actually turns out to be helpful in coming up with the best ac-
count of this document as a whole.
Let me give another example, a structural example, since we are
here at Fordham. I have been very influenced by the work of the
great Dean here on issues of presidential succession,2 so here is a
question for you. Is Newt Gingrich really next in line after Al Gore?
There is a congressional statute that says he is. I am not so sure that
statute is constitutional. Narrowly, there is a textual argument about
what the word "officer" means in the Succession Clause. Congress
can designate officers who are eligible to succeed to a vacant
presidency.
In order to really understand the issue you need to have a global
structural account of the Constitution. For example, we must see the
ways in which a presidential model is different from a parliamentary
one, and how legislatures picking their own leaders as prime ministers
to occupy executive officers is one of the things that our Constitution
repudiated in many different clauses. If Newt Gingrich is an officer
because he is Speaker of the House, were he to take up the presi-
dency, he would have to step down from the speakership. But then he
would no longer be the officer that was the basis for his ascension.
Now, that's because of a clause of the Constitution-the Incompatibil-
ity Clause-and the deep structure behind it. You can't basically be at
both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue at once. You can in England but
not America. There is a deep theory behind that.
Here is another exemplification of that deep theory. When the Vice
President ascends to the presidency, he is no longer the President of
the Senate. There is a specific provision about the vice presidency,
and there is a theory behind it.




Another deep principle is that a person is not supposed to be a
judge in his own case. When you have a presidential, as opposed to a
parliamentary, system of government, the idea is that the President is
in power unless removed by impeachment in a judicial proceeding,
focusing on high crimes and misdemeanors. You can't just have a
simple no-confidence vote of Parliament. Impeachment is a judicial
proceeding, but the problem is if the foreman of the Grand Jury that
indicts, which is the House of Representatives, is the next in line, he
has a conflict of interest in the impeachment process. He is not really
acting very judicially.
Now, we might wonder whether we are just attributing the issue to
our own sense of judicial ethics and propriety. Then, actually, history
is very relevant here, as is text. There is a specific provision of the
Constitution that says the Chief Justice presides in presidential im-
peachments. Why is that? Because otherwise the presiding officer
would ordinarily be the Vice President, who is ex officio President of
the Senate and he should not be presiding in a trial that could vault
him into the oval office. The theory of that clause has implications for
the word officer in the Succession Clause. It can't be about legislative
officers. It is about folks that the President picked to be in his cabinet
as his would-be successors.
There are other clauses that I could invoke. All I want to say is
that, in doing some of that, I reassured myself that I wasn't making all
this up. I looked to six different clauses to try to piece together an
electoral college model, as opposed to a parliamentary prime minster
model. I was reassured when it turned out that, lo and behold, James
Madison said every single one of those things 200 years ago in the
First Congress. So, history can sometimes help us come up with par-
ticularly comprehensive accounts of the document as a whole.
Let me give one final example. I have given you some structural
examples, but let me take an illustration involving rights. It connects
to Professor Kaczorowski's own work about incorporation and the
Bill of Rights. Does the Fourteenth Amendment make applicable
against the states things like freedom of speech and of the press? That
is a hugely important question in constitutional law. If my mother
were to ask me that question, I would say, "Mom, look at the Four-
teenth Amendment, here is what it says: 'No state shall make or en-
force any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States."' Now, what do you think the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States are? I think most ordi-
nary citizens say things like freedom of speech and of the press and
the right to petition. A lot of them would say the right to keep and
bear arms, I should remind you all. But it happens to be a particularly
happy textual feature that the clause resonates in ordinary language in
ways that the folks can understand. Here is a more lawyerly reading
of the clause. That clause contains no less than five textual cross ref-
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erences to other parts of the Constitution. "No state shall" borrows
from Article I, Section 10. "Make or enforce any law which shall
abridge" takes language from the First Amendment. "The privileges
and immunities" is a phrase you see in Article IV. "Of citizens of the
United States" is a paraphrase of the preambulatory "We the People
of the United States," and Dred Scott,3 of course, equates "We the
People" with citizens. Then you have the Due Process Clause, which
is in haec verba with the Fifth Amendment.
As a lawyerly way of looking at the thing, you might say this clause
read carefully is basically telling us to look to the rest of the Constitu-
tion. Its very textual referentiality seems to be giving us strong hints
about where to look, at least as a starting place, perhaps not as the
ending point, for the privilege and immunities of citizens of the
United States. If you were wondering whether I am just overreading
all of that, I am reassured when I read the accounts of historians like
Bob Kaczorowski, who actually say, "John Bingham said all of that,
that's what early courts interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, pre-
Slaughter-House,4 said."
To conclude, I think that history can help support these nifty inter-
pretations of the Constitution-nifty and fitting interpretations of the
Constitution. I don't want to say that is all there is, but it seems to me,
whatever else your theory is, history is a starting point. That is the
first step, perhaps in a multi-step Lessigian translation, to understand
the document as a whole.
It helps us see paradigms beyond clausal paradigms in Jed
Rubenfeld's model. Paradigms like the presidential model. Or with a
justice-seeking account, a la Larry Sager or Chris Eisgruber, it may
actually help us see exactly how much we lose in fit if we deviate from
this starting point in order to do something even more directly justice-
seeking. On Larry Kramer's account, if we want to consider the role
of subsequent precedent and practice as very important, at least we
can see how far we have to deviate from the best interpretation, the
most aesthetically pleasing interpretation, of the document as a whole
in order to accommodate these things. So, I don't want to say that
history is everything. I just want to suggest it is something.
3. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
4. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
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